Strategic Defence Review 2025

 

 

 

Britain’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR) was launched in July 2024 under the current Labour government, aiming to ensure that the UK is “fighting fit” for NATO commitments, with a focus on 2.5% GDP defence spending and a “NATO-first” strategy.

Most of us had expected that it would have been published by now, but the Ministry of Defence (MoD) rumour mill suggests that earlier drafts have been rejected by Starmer’s government. Which begs the question; if it is indeed a truly ‘independent’ review, how can the government direct a re-write, or indeed several re-writes?

But let that one lie for the moment. We are now led to believe it will be published before the NATO summit which is to be this June. Again, don’t hold your breath.

As most folk will be aware, the review is being led by former NATO Secretary General Lord (George) Robertson, with oversight from Defence Secretary John Healey. Robertson’s senior team includes American former White House adviser Fiona Hill and retired British officer General Sir Richard Barrons.

The review is expected to focus on several key areas, including homeland security, support for Ukraine, modernisation of the armed forces, the nuclear deterrent and the UK’s continued leadership in NATO. Robertson said in a press briefing that the UK and its allies were facing a “deadly quartet” of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea and stated that the UK must be prepared to take on all four if necessary.

 The key challenge will be balancing financial realities with military requirements – and ensuring the UK remains a credible defence force in an increasingly volatile world. Budget constraints were a central theme from the very beginning. With defence spending set at 2.5% of GDP (by 2027), questions quickly arose about whether the review could deliver comprehensive solutions within these limits.

General Barrons acknowledged past failures to align ambition with resources, stating, “Every review in my working life has failed, generally within two years…because they have left an enormous gap between ambition and resourcing.” Lord Robertson added, “We cannot guarantee anything…We are operating on the basis of the terms of reference that we were given.”

Now I’m sure Robertson’s team are smart enough not to go down the sunk costs fallacy route; just because we have already spent billions on the aircraft carriers or Ajax armoured vehicles doesn’t mean we need to spend more on them, or even continue to use or operate them. We’re looking at costs in the future, not in the past.

That said, it looks as if the team has been set an almost impossible task. So, as every other Tom, Dick, and Harry has an opinion on what the review might recommend – and bear in mind many of these commentators’ closest association with things military is buying a second-hand German greatcoat from their local Army Surplus store – here are my radical suggestions. If nothing else they might spice up the debate.

First of all, I think we need to acknowledge that historically, and for all the right reasons, UK defence has been based primarily on the Royal Navy, augmented more recently by the RAF. It pains me, a former army officer, to say it, but our chaps on the ground must be a lesser priority.

Against that initial premise, we need to look at the RN first. The Trident submarine fleet, Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent, is probably untouchable as it is the last resort for the defence of the nation. It accounts for roughly six per cent of the UK defence budget, though, and calls have been made to remove it and fund it from elsewhere (where though?) which would free up funds.

This might make sense. The RN is crying out for additional surface vessels and attack submarines, and the matelots to crew them. Much of the RN budget recently has been committed to procuring and equipping the two aircraft carriers HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales. Can we afford to keep two operational at a time of financial difficulty? Possibly not, and mothballing one even temporarily might be a wise move, saving funds better spent elsewhere.

The RN could certainly do with an additional couple or more of the T26 and/or T31 frigates and an accelerated procurement programme for the new T83 destroyers, plus any additional Astute class attack submarines that might be squeezed in.

Next, the RAF, which is short of both aircraft and trained pilots. I believe that after the delivery of the first order batch of 48 F-35Bs jets from the USA the UK should not proceed with any further orders for this aircraft. Britain’s long-term commitment is for a total of 138 aircraft, but the timeline for further orders beyond the initial 48 is not yet confirmed.

Good. The USA can no longer be regarded as a reliable ally and Britain cannot afford to be dependent on the whims and peccadilloes of the current Trump administration. Far better to procure additional Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft, which are good enough for present requirements, and then concentrate resources on the Tempest/GCAP project for future needs, accelerating the programme if possible. There are other examples but enough for now.

Which brings us to the British army. Here I’m going to play the Devil’s Advocate role. It has been generally acknowledged that the army is far too small at some 72,000 regular personnel. Most credible commentators have said it needs to be at least 100,000 strong to be able to fulfil any meaningful NATO role. To continue to state we can commit an armoured division to the Alliance is cloud cuckoo land.

So, let’s reassess the situation completely. If Britain cannot fulfil this commitment we should look at the problem from a new perspective. Forget 100,000, how about reducing the army even further to around 50,000 and make its main focus homeland defence and the protection of our remaining and important overseas commitments to places like Gibraltar, Cyprus, and the Falkland Islands (not forgetting Diego Garcia if Starmer hasn’t sold it down the river by then)?

This offers immediate saving opportunities. It pains me to say it as a former officer in the Royal Tank Regiment, but if we’re looking at only 148 Challenger 3 main battle tanks (MBTs) in the Royal Armoured Corps then we may as well not bother at all. Other continental armies can do it better and in the right quantities. The same applies to the disastrous Ajax programme and even to aspects of the wheeled Boxer IFV procurement. Cut both programmes to the bone.

In their place, using the funds released, the army sorely needs to re-equip with air defence and artillery. The current media fascination with drone warfare will pass as antidotes are developed, but the threat from the air will remain. Currently the UK has no credible ground-based air defence (GBAD) worth talking about, and certainly no defence of the homeland against ballistic or cruise missiles.

I could go on ad infinitum but I think that’s probably enough. Robertson and co have been set an impossible task by politicians who don’t really understand what is facing them and the UK defence-wise. Our boys and girls in uniform will always attempt to do what is asked of them, but they’re doing so with one arm tied behind their backs.

And the UK is being let down by the current crop of military officers of all services for reasons that only they can explain. Their failure to speak out publicly or resign in disgust is a classic example of lack of moral fibre. RAF aircrew who found it impossible to fly over Germany again after multiple operations in 1943-45 were often accused of this back in the day.

But I think I know who the bigger cowards are now.

Lt Col Stuart Crawford is a defence analyst and former army officer. Sign up for his podcasts and newsletters at www.DefenceReview.uk

 

 

Lt Col Stuart Crawford’s latest book Tank Commander (Hardback) is available now

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