What are we to make of  last Tuesday’s presumed drone attack on the Kremlin? All the indications are that two small uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) exploded on or above the Kremlin’s Senate building roughly sixteen minutes apart, all caught on numerous video recordings. Damage appears to have been slight. Predictably, the Russians were quick to blame Ukraine, and also that the attacks were sponsored and originated from Washington DC, an allegation that has been strenuously denied by the Americans. To date the USA has been reluctant to overtly encourage attacks on Russian territory.

There’s lots of speculation about who, therefore, might be responsible for the attack but very little hard evidence to back it up. Let’s have a quick look at the possibilities. First up is the theory that it could be a Russia/Putin initiated “false flag” stunt, and attempt to simulate an attack by Russia’s enemies, primarily Ukraine, to rally the Russian population to back the current conflict.

Now, although Russia is not averse to such false flag operations it seems unlikely in this case. Any attack that managed to breach Russian defences and reach the Kremlin, the very heart of the Russian state, would be a complete and utter embarrassment for both Putin and his presidency, and signify a weakness that could lead to his and his government’s demise.

If he can’t keep Moscow safe, they might ask, then how can he possibly keep the rest of us safe? Accordingly, I think this explanation is highly unlikely.

It is possible, of course, that a homegrown terrorist organisation or subversive opposition terrorist group within Russia itself could be responsible, with or without external support. The small and seemingly limited effect of the explosions point to a payload carried by small drones which could possibly have been launched from within the capital itself. How else can we explain the failure of Moscow’s comprehensive air defence systems to intercept them?

So, if it wasn’t the Russians themselves, either false flag or internal dissent, who was it? The obvious suspects are the Ukrainians, but this throws up some interesting questions. They have, of course, demonstrated their capabilities in this sphere with past drone attacks on airbases and fuel and ammunition dumps inside Russia and Russia-occupied Crimea, some with dramatic results.

But Moscow is another thing altogether. Russia’s capital has extensive and multi-layered air defences and it would seem to be impossible for drones launched many hundreds of kilometres away in Ukraine to reach the Kremlin without being intercepted or their guidance jammed or spoofed.

However, what if by some miracle this is what happened? What would the significance be?

Well, given the small explosions that occurred the damage would be much more psychological than physical. It could be considered that the Ukrainian attack, if that’s what it was, was a sort of modern day equivalent of the USA’s Doolittle Raid of April 1942.

Those not familiar with Second World War history may not be aware of this epic event. After the sneak Japanese attack on the US naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in December 1941, President Roosevelt and his Chiefs of Staff demanded a speedy response to lift American morale.

It was decided that a retaliatory bombing raid onthe Japanese islands would demonstrate America’s resolve and also show the Japanese population that their country was not invulnerable to attack.

In a daring and risky operation, sixteen American B-25 Marauder bombers were launched from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet and bombed Tokyo and various other targets on what was essentially a one-way mission.

The plan was that the aircraft would carry on and land in friendly China, where they would refuel and make their way to American bases. In the end, all of the aircraft crashed in China, although most crew survived. The one exception was the B-25 that landed near Vladivostok in the Soviet Union where the aircraft was impounded and the crew interned (although secretly released after a few months).

In terms of military effectiveness the raid was a failure; damage to Japanese installations was minimal. But in terms of psychological damage it was effective, as the Japanese population had up to that point considered themselves to be out of harm’s way. It was a portent of far worse things to come.

Could at be that the drone attack on the Kremlin had the same thought in mind? We still cannot be sure who was responsible for the attack and will probably only find out in the fullness of time, if ever.

However, if it was Ukraine then it is yet another humiliation for Putin. And perhaps the populations of Moscow and greater Russia are now sleeping less soundly in their beds?

Lt Col Stuart Crawford is a defence analyst and former army officer. Sign up for his podcasts and newsletters at www.DefenceReview.uk

 

 

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Recent speculation in the world’s media on when the long-anticipated Ukrainian counter-offensive against their Russian invaders will begin has now reached almost hysterical proportions. When is it coming, they ask? And, quite rightly, the UkrAF remain tight-lipped. There’s no point in forewarning your enemy after all. Surprise is key to most successful military operations.

What might be holding it up is the other question. There are a number of factors which might explain the delay. First there is the weather at this time of year. We all knew that the manoeuvrability of ground forces is seriously compromised by the spring mud season – the Ukrainians call it “bezdorizhzhya”, the Russians “rasputitsa” – that follows the thaw, and so it has proved to be.

By all accounts the rainfall in Ukraine has also been heavier and has lasted longer this year, resulting in a glutinous and clinging mud that essentially brings movement off metalled roads to a halt. And Ukraine has relatively few tarmacadamed roads compared to most western European countries. The rest are more akin to dirt highways and farm tracks, fine in summer but not so good at the moment.

The second major factor which seems likely to be delaying any major Ukrainian offensive so far is lack or resources. While the UkrAF have proved reluctant to publicise their own losses, they are likely to be serious in both men and materiel. Less than the Russians it would appear, but still significant.

Notwithstanding the influx of western equipment and the training of UkrAF personnel in its use in the UK and elsewhere, they are probably not yet ready. Yes, some 250 western main battle tanks have now been delivered plus many more armoured fighting vehicles, but the UkrAF still lack three critical components in sufficient numbers; fast jets, air defence weaponry, and ammunition.

We have noted all of this before, but until Ukraine feels comfortable that is can bring a critical mass of its forces – in attack usually a ratio of three attackers to every defender is the minimum – to the main point of effort then the outcome will be in the balance. More than anything else, it needs to achieve air superiority even if limited in time and place to allow its forces to manoeuvre.

If they do manage to get all their ducks in a row, though, where might the blow fall? There appear to be three main options; a thrust into the Donbas from the east or north-east (or both), trying to continue the successes of the Kharkiv offensives and take back territory held there by the Russians since 2014.

This I think is the least likely. The Russians have had nine years to prepare their positions and the ground has been fought over many times before. In any case, the current fighting around Bakhmut, which the Russians seem to be determined to capture at any cost, is keeping their forces tied down which probably suits the Ukrainians very well. I suspect this will continue as a sort of holding action by the UkrAF, preventing enemy forces being deployed elsewhere.

The second might be to attack south from the Kherson area, across the Dnipro river, and threaten Russian-held Crimea via the Isthmus of Perekop, an invasion route favoured historically by many including Germany in the Second World War. Indeed, there are reports that the UkrAF may have already secured a small toehold on the left (eastern) bank of the river close to Kherson city.

This is fraught with difficulty. The Dnipro is a major river obstacle, and whilst moving small units across seems to have been feasible, getting a major offensive grouping to do the same in the face of determined opposition is another thing altogether. The risks may be too great.

Which leaves us with the military pundits’ favourite, a thrust south from the area of Zaporizhzhia to Melitopol and beyond to the Sea of Azov, thereby cutting Russian land communications, and supply routes, to Kherson Oblast, and making their occupying forces vulnerable to being rolled up from the east. Ukrainian success here would also bring much of Crimea within range of their precision artillery and missiles.

This too is hardly risk free. It is perhaps the most obvious course of action, and Russia has been building several lines of defences to counter just such a move. However, there are no major river systems to be crossed and the ground, when dry, is eminently suitable for armoured forces.

Will Ukraine double-bluff the Russians and strike here as many expect? Once again secrecy prevails, but with the right equipment and training, sufficient supplies of ammunition, and a favourable force ratio it may well be doable. Ukraine has surprised us all before in this war.

As for when the offensive might begin, well, that might be slightly easier to forecast. The ground should have firmed up by mid-June, and if UkrAF logistic build-ups and formation training are completed we might see some movement by then.

Until such times as one side makes a move, however, the stalemate will continue.

Lt Col Stuart Crawford is a defence analyst and former army officer. Sign up for his podcasts and newsletters at www.DefenceReview.uk

 

 

Lt Col Stuart Crawford’s latest book Tank Commander (Hardback) is available now

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So, what’s going on in Sudan then? Over the past week or so we have watched the country descend into a fair approximation of chaos as two former allies in the country, General Abdel Fattah Burhan who commands the regular Sudanese army, and his former deputy, General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo – a former camel dealer widely known as Hemedti – who leads the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), battle it out for control.

They were meant to join together and deliver a civilian, democratically-elected government to their impoverished country, but have ended up at each other’s throats. Hundreds have been killed and injured in the violence and now western nations are scrambling to get their nationals out.

Sudan is an important regional power and, despitethe poverty of its indigenous population, has attractive natural resources in oil and gold which others eye with envy. Traditionally the USA has not held much sway in this part of Africa, but its attention has been focussed recently by rumours of Russia’s increasing presence in the country, including the infamous Wagner Group which is alleged to be involved in gold smuggling.

Russia has also negotiated a yet to be ratified agreement to establish a naval base on the Red Sea coast, not too far in strategic terms from the southern entrance to the Suez Canal, through which some ten per cent of world trade passes. You can probably recall what happened when the container ship the Ever Given got stuck there, causing widespread disruption.

But geopolitics aside there are real problems for Sudan and the people who live there, with large movements seeking solace in neighbouring countries, yet another refugee crisis that the world will have to deal with.

In common with most countries that have workers in Sudan, the UK has called for all British nationals who can to exit the country and has set up an extraction and movement group to expedite this, drawn from all three armed services.

Britain chose to evacuate its diplomatic staff first, a move which has attracted widespread criticism in the media, but there may have been good reasons for so doing. For starters, the UK has more nationals in Sudan than most other countries, and the initial seventy-two hour ceasefire period was never going to be long enough to get the estimated 2,000 – 4,000 individuals out.

Plus it was judged that diplomatic staff would be much more useful operating in support of the evacuation from somewhere safer where internet and telephone communications were not constantly at risk of going down. Other nations with smaller numbers to extract took the decision to airlift out their diplomatic staff and other nationals at the same time, a decision that was probably right for them.

Criticism has also been levelled at UK planners for those seeking to escape to self-drive to the airstrip where the British armed forces contingent is based, some hour’s drive from central Khartoum, rather than organising convoys and escorting them there.

Again, this is a decision that has been taken by those on the ground who know what they are doing, or at least what they’re trying to do. It was probably judged that individual vehicles were less likely to attract hostility than larger groups; the fact that the French chose a convoy approach and one of them was attacked, severely injuring one of their soldiers, illustrates the difficulties here.

The truth seems to be that the UK reacted as quickly as most and quicker than some in setting up and deploying its evacuation forces. At the time of writing, for example, the USA, which may have as many as 20,000 US nationals in Sudan, has not started to extract its civilians. Britain will also have to operate for longer in-country than other nations with smaller numbers to rescue.

Situations like this always tend to be chaotic, and our armed forces’ overarching task is to bring some order to a chaotic situation in the safest way possible in the circumstances. Thanks goodness that we have the well-trained, motivated, and adaptable – plus compassionate – young men and women in all three of our services to carry out this difficult task with the support of FCDO and other NGO staff.

We can only hope that we manage to get all of our people out before, as it might do, Sudan descends into total anarchy.

Lt Col Stuart Crawford is a defence analyst and former army officer. Sign up for his podcasts and newsletters at www.DefenceReview.uk

 

 

Lt Col Stuart Crawford’s latest book Tank Commander (Hardback) is available now

• http://www.DefenceReview.UK
• @peoplemattertv
• @509298